At the Hudson Institute’s website for South Asia (southasiaathudson.org), I have a new piece looking at India’s recent operation in Myanmar. Be sure to check it out. It is also probably where I will be writing most of my South Asia related pieces.
DC in Chaos as Interns Declare Caliphate
A Satirical Piece I decided to write. Hopefully I’ll be able to put some more serious posts up soon.
Chaos hit the streets in DC as a group of interns managed to overrun large parts of two different think tanks located in Dupont Circle declare that they have created a new caliphate. The announcement came as a surprise to many who have largely turned away from the various problems happening in the region.
“We thought the interns were bogged down in their location with a heavy workload and dealing with competition from other interns. This will have a destabilizing effect among the greater think tank world.” Said J.M. Berger of Brookings Institution.
After declaring the establishment of a caliphate, the mysterious leader, supposedly a research associate from one of the conquered think tanks, appeared in a video asking for all interns to rush to the new caliphate.
“Rush o interns, to your think tank. Yes, your think tank. It is not a think tank simply for the conservatives or liberals, nor for the Asian experts or Latin American researchers. All interns, no matter your specialty, this is where you can apply your skills.”
Little is known about this research associate. Most likely he was never formally hired or paid, leaving a very small paper trail for people to trace. The video of him has yet to be authenticated. In the video, he also called out of several think tanks and other agencies for violation against interns.
“From Amnesty International to the State Department, be warned. Your crimes against us will end. It might take a while, but we will have our revenge.”
Republican policymakers were quick to blame the Obama administration for failing to arm moderate interns. Senator John McCain was perhaps the most vocal on the issue.
“The failure of the Obama administration to act decisively against these radical interns and the failure to help the moderates out. If the administration had worked to give money and supplies to the moderates, IS probably would never have gained power.”
Others disagreed. “The moderate interns were never that well organized. Between work and trying to make money, the moderate groups lacked the organizational cohesion to actually compete against the radicals.” According to George Washington University Professor Marc Lynch. “The few interns that were given supplies took their tablets and pens to IS due to their frustration with the inefficiency of the moderate groups.”
The repercussions against interns around DC was being felt in public. Public figures such as Sam Harris and Bill Maher have come out and said that the establishment of IS proves the inherently violent nature of internship. Sam Harris has warned that even 20% of interns should be considered radical. Asked to expand on this, he had this to say,
“Well, again, you have to parse this on specific points, like do you favor getting paid for your work, do you think there should be a job guarantee? Even among interns, you’d find more subscribing to one versus the other, depending on the poll you trust. But I didn’t just pull the number out of a hat. There’s a group at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill that has conducted 40 years of study in the intern world – literally every intern that has been hired – and found that these views were prevalent among 15 percent of the interns.
So I would say that if you take this number 15 percent who agree with payment, and then you look at the poll results on specific implementation of intern’s demands – do you want research fellows and government officials to give recommendation letters or should you be hired – you never find the number, with very few exceptions, you never find the number as low as 15 percent voting in favor of these deals. It’s often 60 percent depending on the type of internship. So I believe nudging that up to something around 20 percent is still a conservative estimate of the percentage of interns worldwide who have values relating to employment and work ethics that are really in zero sum contests with our own.”
Despite the complete nonsensical, bullshit logic behind this, this view has remained popular among internphobes.
Interns meanwhile have come out strongly to condemn IS and suggest the should not be perceived as real interns.
“Just look at them and their background. They act like they’re good interns, but look at their pasts. They rarely did any work. They would show up late, never get the projects done, and spend the entire day on Facebook and Twitter. These are just crazy people who have become distant in disenchanted with their own internships, and have turned to what they view as a crazy utopia to fill that empty hole inside them.” Said an intern from Carnegie.
This looks like it will be a long term struggle against these interns.
Graeme Wood’s Article in the Atlantic and responses
So Graeme Wood wrote a provoking article for The Atlantic titled “What ISIS Really Wants“. In it, he argues that rather than ISIS being a fringe groups of psychopaths, its ideology is based on Islamic ideology. Although he mentions that (albeit briefly) their doctrine is not mainstream Islam, nor does it followers represent the overwhelming majority of Muslims, ISIS is still Islamic. This has generated plenty of discussion and responses. Here are the ones worth reading.
Jack Jenkins at Think Progress
Ross Douthat at New York Times
Fareed Zakaria at the Washington Post
Shadi Hamid (whose tweets were helpfully compiled)
Murtaza Hussain at the Intercept
Mohamed Ghilan at MIddle East Eye
Ishaan Tharoor at the Washington Post
Jack Jenkins at Think Progress (2)
All these are useful readings. Rather than waste more internet space with my own words, its easier to let these articles to the talking. My own views tend to be a lot closer to Berger’s and Hamid’s responses.
Update:
So Graeme wrote a very short followup to his article. It contains some of the responses I posted here, as well as some interesting reactions from an Islamist and some ISIS and AQ supporters. Definitely worth checking out.
My First Article
Hey,
For the very, very, very few people who read this blog, I just published my first article at the International Affairs Review. This is a graduate student journal at George Washington University. Its a relatively short article on Hindutva, a topic I had discussed here previously. Of course, what I was able to write was limited, so I didn’t get the chance to expand on the history of the movement or the circumstances of why they became powerful. Hopefully in the future, I will have the chance to expand, but that’s publishing for you. Also, I didn’t come up with the summary that was put there. A subscriber to Hindutva ideology is different from a right wing BJP member. To put it simply, a right wing BJP member is like a conservative in the US, different from a evangelical Christian that is more common on the Christian right.
Anyway, enjoy.
The Recent Articles from TNI
The National Interest remains of my favorite international affairs magazines. Although there are several authors that I do not like or necessarily agree with, the majority of the content is usually one of high quality and diverse views.
However, the magazine has started a recent series of articles that could be simplified to “top 5 (insert topic here) in history/the world” or “top 5 weapons that (Insert country here) possesses that (insert country here) should fear.” Although writing some of the articles every once in a while can be interesting, the recent surge of these articles have created some articles that do not meet the usual quality at TNI.
Take for example one of the recent additions to the slew of articles is “The 5 Deadliest Terrorist Groups on the Planet“. As the author, Daneil DePetris, notes at the very beginning that although you are more likely to be killed by other things (like lightning) instead of terrorism, the issue remains important. The terrorist groups chosen are the five deadliest terrorism groups operating today. Except, the author never specifies his methodology in creating the list. How is deadliest defined? Is it the amount of casualties the organization has inflicted? The capabilities of the organization? Also how is terrorism defined? Although the majority of the groups listed would fit the standard definition of terrorism (i.e. a non-state actor that spreads terror (like attacking civilians) in order to achieve a political, ideological, and or religious goal). Yet, he decides to label Iran’s revolutionary guard as a terrorist group. Yes the organization does aid groups that are considered terrorist organizations. But it is actually part of the Iranian government, not a non-state actor. Although one can argue that the actions by governments constitute terrorism, the author does not take the time to define it.
So the inclusion of the Iranian revolutionary guards is questionable. What about the other organizations listed?
While ISIS is a no brainer, the other groups are very contestable. Yes Boko Haram remains a dangerous organization, Al Shabaab is also a serious threat, one that is arguably as dangerous (if not more so) than Boko Haram. The same goes for the Haqqani Network. Lashkar e Taiba has been able to conduct attacks in India and Afghanistan, has been found in Iraq, as well as maintaining a network throughout most of South Asia. The fact that Kata’ib Hezbollah is on the list while the original Hezbollah is not is a complete joke. Hezbollah is the most powerful force in Lebanon, is the only Arab fighting force to obtain a victory over Israel (the 2006 war), is gaining additional fighting experience in Syria, and has conducted attacks worldwide. Hezbollah has long been considered on of the most effective terrorist organizations in the world. The fact that Kata’ib Hezbollah is on the list and Hezbollah isn’t is completely ridiculous.
I still enjoy reading TNI, but this recent slew of articles making these silly lists is just becoming a little bit too much.
Weekly Linkages
How Ibn Khaldun explains the success of many militant groups today.
To understand ISIS, you have to understand the history of Wahhabism (or Salafi) in Saudi Arabia.
Here’s an effective way to respond to the atrocities of ISIS, with humor.
The great blog Political Violence @ a glance has some fantastic posts giving some background on ISIS, its strategy in broadcasting its atrocities, and the need to think of a political strategy when fighting the organization.
Hindu nationalists and their love for the ‘love jihad’. I had briefly discussed the subject here. Another article discusses the parallel narratives of Modi’s government, one of good governance, one of Hindu nationalism.
Husain Haqqani examines the protests in Pakistan.
Jonah Blank looks at how Kashmir will be affected by the U.S. draw down in Afghanistan.
A good National Interest article giving some background on the burgeoning Indo-U.S. defense relationship
Paul Pillar talks about the temptation by hawks to lump everything Islamist together.
Finally at Vice News, John Horgan discusses the difficulty in explaining why people join terrorist organizations, and Natasha Lennard argues that deradicalization programs are the wrong response to ISIS.
Al Qaeda’s new branch in India
Al Qaeda recently announced that they shall be creating a new branch of their franchise for the Indian Subcontinent. The countries that will be targeted by this new branch include India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The new head of this organization is Umar Asim, a commander of the Pakistani Taliban. AQIS (Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (Arabic: جماعة قاعدة الجهاد في شبة القارة الهندية) literally Group (or Organization) of the base for Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent), according to Zarawahiri, is to essentially ‘liberate’ the Muslims in the aforementioned areas from injustice and oppression. By Zawahiri’s account, this new extension has been in the works for the last two years. Whether this is true or not, the formation of this group cannot be viewed in isolation.
The timing of this new branch, like most commentators have already discussed, is coming in a period where Al Qaeda has suffered a loss in credibility and prestige with the recent success of ISIS in the Middle East. Not only has ISIS controlled such a large area (along with governing it), it has also successfully held off Al Qaeda’s local franchise (Jabhat Al Nusra) as well as the Assad government. Indeed, with the death of Osama Bin Laden (a charismatic speaker) and its weakening franchises (like Al Shabaab), and other franchises declaring loyalty to ISIS (like AQAP), AQ needs a booster.
So what can Al Qaeda do? They focus on the one region where ISIS does not have strong connections. South Asia has a long history of jihadi terrorism as well as several issues that can appeal to Muslims in the subcontinent (like the fear of Buddhist and Hindu extremists). There is a fear that ISIS will make inroads into South Asia. ISIS pamphlets have already been seen distributed in Pakistan, has attracted some Indians to come fight (a rare thing as I briefly discussed here), and has proliferated multiple recruitment videos in South Asian languages, AQ has a real fear that ISIS will overtake them in a region where they currently have the advantage.
Yet AQIS is a threat to the subcontinent. Both India and Bangladesh are relatively weak states (in the sense they cannot properly implement the rule of law in all areas they control (more discussion about this in a future post)) that already have to worry about a well-established terrorist network in South Asia (established by groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba). There have also been indications that the fighters for the Indian Mujahideen have started to align themselves with Al Qaeda (thanks to the leadership of the organization having been captured). Although AQIS might not become the most powerful group in South Asia (an unfortunate honor that can arguably be given to LeT), it could gain the operational capability to threaten the region in the near future. Indeed, both the Indian and Bangladeshi governments have stated that they are taking the issue seriously.
But the importance of India to jihadis is often overstated. Although Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members made reference to India as a potential target (the Zionist-Crusader-Hindu alliance), it was actually never a serious threat. The previous mentions of India or Kashmir had usually been minor, especially compared to their statements against the United States. Even in the first instance Bin Laden mentioned the Zionist-Crusader-Hindu alliance, the country of Sudan was mentioned and criticized more than Hindus, India or Kashmir. Even in the ideology of many transnational jihadist groups (most based in the Middle East), the focus has been on America and Israel, as well as the so called secular Arab regimes. In fact, the addition of Hindu to the alliance was done by Pakistani groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba in order to try to integrate their objectives with the global jihadi movement. Indeed, LeT has aided Al Qaeda while it has been stationed in Pakistan, although LeT has enough power and its own objectives to be independent from the infamous terrorist organization. With the organization suffering a loss in prestige, it will attempt to try and appeal to Muslims in areas that ISIS has little to no influence. As a result, it would not be surprising if Al Qaeda will continue to integrate its ideology more with the current Pakistani jihadist beliefs.
It will take some time to see whether this group will turn out to be a serious threat or not. Although some Indian commentators have insinuated that China and Pakistan will support this group (both directly and indirectly), this is also unlikely. Other authors have accused the ISI of supporting Al Qaeda, but much of this is based on circumstantial evidence. It is also very unlikely that China would support an Islamist group against India that could possibly turn to the Uighur problem next.
At this time, not enough information has been released about the group to get a clearer picture of this organization. As time goes on, we will become more acquainted with this new branch, although we should really hope not.
Weekly Linkages
Based on the current surveys being conducted in Syria, guest authors at politicalviolence@aglance consider the implications should the Assad government take back Aleppo.
Why the U.S. and its allies are responsible for the rise of ISIS (and no, its not the conspiracy)
Alex Horton reveals his online conversation he had with an ISIS supporter.
Daniel Byman analyzes Israel’s strategy towards Hamas.
Here is an important article on Oman, an under discussed power in Middle Eastern politics.
At Sada, Sahar Aziz looks at the role the Egyptian judiciary plays in the politics of the country.
Why did Egypt and the UAE intervene in Libya?
Are the Indian NGO laws part of a global trend?
A short piece on Modi’s new initiative to give a bank account to the poor.
Shlomo Brom and Shimon Stein suggest that the UNSC resolutions that the peace negotiations were based on are holding back the peace process.
In Foreign Policy, several authors talk about the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East.
Daniel Markey and Shuja Nawaz examine the protests in Pakistan.
Ira Trivedi discusses sexual violence in India and why it is rising.
Finally, in Economic and Political Weekly, Nani Mahanta discusses the implications of the BJP success in Assam.
The Hindu Extremist Narrative on Islam
Americans are often criticized for their lack of knowledge on international affairs and events. For citizens living in a state that is currently the world’s superpower and whose very actions can influence the international system. It is definitely necessary that Americans learn more about the world as they have some say on actions that their government takes. That said, it’s unfortunate that many people around the world are also very ignorant on international affairs. Many people around the world were critical of U.S. actions in Iraq (which I mostly agree with), but this was not due to the enlightened knowledge of the world’s population, but rather how people when they perceive as an attack by a powerful state. Similarly, India was criticized by the majority of the world for its intervention in the liberation of Bangladesh despite the ongoing genocide (although India’s intervention was opportunistic in order to severely weaken its rival Pakistan).
History and international affairs is complex. Scholars and practitioners spend years learning about the history and complex forces that are present in the societies in the world. For the overwhelming majority of people though, there isn’t the same drive or desire to learn about this. After all what is easier for people to understand: the complex structural and historical problems that have held back the potential of the Indian economy, or blaming it on Hinduism? Similarly, why look at the complex history and politics at play in the Middle East when you can blame it on Muslims?
This oversimplification along with racist and nationalistic attitudes leads to the creation of narratives. Usually these extremists’ narratives are exactly that, extremist. However, they sometimes influence the political discourse, making the moderate discourse more extremist. The influence can spread due a lack of education making the spread of this discourse extremely simple. In order to counter this discourse, the population needs to be educated as well as have regular contact with those who are being demonized (e.g. the other ethnic, religious, income group). Although this is not a perfect solution, it will help. Unfortunately, it will not be effective on everyone as people can simply go through as many hoops as possible to deny the evidence (for a good example of this, read this article). Changing a person’s perception is a difficult thing to do. With this post, I hope to start challenging some of the perceptions that Hindu extremists have propagated towards Muslims.
As I have written in the recent past about the rise of Hindu extremism and its demonization of Islam. With the election of what is seen as a Hindu nationalist group to power, many of the same extremists have felt empowered to spread what they believe and fan the flames of communal tension. It is an unfortunate reality that many politicians have decided to continue what the British have done and try and divide the population. The British have always had a strategy of divide and rule in order to hold on to their imperial gains. To this effect, the British even started to distort histories to show the Muslim rulers as barbarians intent on eliminating the Hindu population. Even with the independence of India, the narratives and tactics introduced by the British were adopted. Indeed, a popular complaint against the Muslims by Hindus is that the Mughal Kings had destroyed Hindu temples. Yet this was not a shift in policy. Many Hindu kings had also destroyed temples for the same reasons that the Muslims did, to loot and destroy the political images that were associated with their rival king. Hell, the Indian military destroyed temples in Sri Lanka during India’s intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war.
Another fear exaggerated by Hindu extremists is that should Muslims become the majority, Sharia law will be enacted. Now there are two problems with this belief. According to polls, the respect for civil liberties such as the freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly is practically equal between Hindus and Muslims. Defining sharia is also problematic. A minority of Muslims interpret sharia as the horrible, barbaric rule seen under ISIS or the Taliban while the majority see the U.S. constitution as being the perfect embodiment of sharia law. For Hindu extremists, the only sharia law that exists is that of the Taliban, and should Muslims become a majority (even if it is a slim majority like 50.01%) the Muslims will enact sharia law. Yes obviously, that’s why Muslim majority countries like Turkey, Tunisia, most of the Central Asian republics, and most of the Muslim sub-Saharan countries have sharia (oh wait). Well, that’s why Indonesia, being an Muslim majority country, is a harsh dictatorship, or has freedom house and polity iv scores comparable of that of India. Apparently, Muslims being the majority does not mean there will be sharia law, and having Muslims in the majority does not mean that the country will become a Taliban like dictatorship.
Another fear cited by the Hindu extremists is the higher birth rate among the Muslim population. Indeed Muslims have a higher birth rate than other religious groups in the country, but that is common among economically disadvantaged populations around the world. Indeed as India develops and economic opportunity becomes available to all, the birth rate will drop like everybody else’s. (There’s also a well believed conspiracy going around that Muslims are united trying to trick young, naive girls to fall in love with them and convert, something called a love jihad. Sound ridiculous and unrealistic? Because it is. Here’s a great article about the use of these conspiracies by right wing Hindus to regulate a woman’s body).
A popular crying call by these same Hindu nationalists is to argue that Muslims will gladly cry out against the Israeli’s during the Gaza war, but refuse to call out ISIS or other Islamic terrorist groups that carry out horrendous acts. Of course, this is also a popular belief in western countries who have little to no knowledge of the Middle East, or any Muslim community at all. Indeed all around the world, Muslims, both the elite and the common person, have come out against ISIS. As ISIS began to take over the headlines, Muslim intellectuals from all over India condemned the terrorist group even going so far as to say, “Their brutality is worse than genocide.” For all the commotion about the four Indian Muslims who went to join ISIS (despite the rhetoric by the Hindu extremists, specialists in Islamic terrorism have found that this is the first credible story of Indian Muslims joining the so called global jihad). Yet, there have been more Indian Muslims who have volunteered to go fight against ISIS. The narrative that Indian Muslims only complain when Muslims are being killed is a popular one, but it completely dies in the face of evidence.
Finally, there is the idea of the Muslim vote bank, or the idea that Muslims all vote for Muslim only candidates or parties as a cohesive block. This myth has been disproven by the previous election and other analysts . But accusing a rival candidate of only caring about the minority and not the majority is a common electoral tactic used by political parties.
To fight any form of extremism, battling the narratives is needed. Communal harmony is necessary for any nation to advance. In future posts, I will also try to examine some of the talking points for other types of extremist groups.
Al Raiy 
